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APPLICABLE TO THE MODERN-DAY SAFETY AND SECURITY
CHALLENGE AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

OREN R. GRIFFIN*
ABSTRACT
This Article focuses on campus safety and security in higher education. In
light of the numerous stakeholders in higher education that include faculty, law
enforcement professionals, higher education lawyers, state and federal
officials, and institutional administrators, this Article examines legal and
policy considerations that should influence how colleges and universities
respond to protect the campus community and safeguard the educational
environment. In particular, the Article discusses the Incident Command
System and the impact this management approach has had on the development
of an organizational framework to manage emergency incidents. The Article
also reviews selected case law regarding campus safety and state and federal
statutory responses designed to minimize threats to campus safety. Finally, the
Article acknowledges the role that members of the university community play
in advancing campus security as well as the application of risk management
concepts and strategies in the campus safety and security arena. Recognizing
that colleges and universities are vital national institutions, the article
encourages the development of a legal and managerial paradigm to deal with
the modern-day perplexities of campus safety and security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As criminal behavior and unprovoked acts of violence have become an
ever-growing presence in American life, higher education institutions have not
been spared the experience of being the scene of such acts. In recent years,
various active shooter incidents have occurred on college campuses across the
country and abroad with horrific results.1 Numerous stakeholders, including
higher education administrators, faculty, law enforcement professionals, higher
education lawyers, and state and federal officials, among others, have begun to
examine how colleges and universities should respond to protect the campus
community and safeguard the educational environment. As these recent
campus shootings raise the specter of public concern, educational institutions
must examine their ability and capacity to respond to emergency incidents on
campus.2
This Article explores the complex array of concerns that influence campus
safety and security. Addressed first is a discussion of the Incident Command
System, also referred to as the incident management system, which has been
recognized by state and federal agencies, public safety and law enforcement
organizations, and professional groups as providing the necessary framework
to manage emergency incidents. Second, the Article examines selected case
law implicating campus safety, identifying the view courts have taken to the
liability exposure colleges and universities have experienced and may continue
to experience. Third, the Article reviews selected statutory responses designed
to minimize threats to campus security and safety. Fourth, the Article
considers the role that faculty may play in advancing campus security as well
as the application of risk management concepts and strategies to the campus
safety and security arena. The conclusion offers a series of recommendations
that higher education administrators and their legal counsel may consider as
their institutions negotiate the modern-day perplexities of campus safety and
security.

1. See Timeline: Shootings at U.S. College Campuses, NPR, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9603275 (listing shootings from recent
decades); Anthony DePalma, Questions Outweigh Answers in Shooting Spree at College, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A1; Timeline of School Shootings, BBC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7631162.stm.
2. It is troubling that, to the extent administrators, lawyers, and other professionals working
with educational institutions do not respond promptly and effectively to the emergency
preparedness concern, the void may be filled with less favorable approaches. See, e.g., James C.
McKinley, Jr., In Texas School, Some Teachers Carry Books, Chalk and Pistol, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2008, at A1 (discussing a proposal to provide guns to teachers and administrators at public
schools in Texas as a response to safety concerns).
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II. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS
The Incident Command System (“ICS”) encompasses management
concepts and principles intended to apply in crisis and emergency situations to
minimize chaos and maximize the potential for an effective response to a
crisis.3 The ICS management approach originated in the late 1960s in response
to the devastating wildfires that ravaged southern California.4 Given the
challenge faced by firefighters and other public safety professionals, ICS
provided a framework for organizing the critical resources needed to save lives
and property.5 The ICS was developed through cooperative efforts among
federal, state, and local governmental agencies in reaction to the harmful
disorder that existed among agencies that respond to life-threatening events.6
It represented a significant shift in the approach used to manage large-scale
emergency incidents.7
In February 2003, triggered by an imperative need for intergovernmental
cooperation regarding emergency preparedness, President George W. Bush
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which legally
required intergovernmental cooperation for major incident response efforts.8
HSPD-5 requires all federal agencies to collaborate with the Department of
Homeland Security to adopt a National Response Plan (“NRP”) and a National
Incident Management System (“NIMS”).9 The NRP focuses on developing a
national approach to domestic incident management to incorporate the
resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental
organizations.10 Acknowledging ICS as the cornerstone of any disaster
response effort, NIMS provides a structural framework for incident
management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause, size, or

3. ICS is also referred to as the Incident Management System in the relevant literature. See
LOUIS N. MOLINO, SR., EMERGENCY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDAMENTALS AND
APPLICATIONS 1 (2006).
4. Id. at 5; see also James Parker, “Be Prepared”: Safety Professionals Must Learn the
Incident Command System, SAFETY & HEALTH, Apr. 2005, at 26, 26.
5. MOLINO, supra note 3, at 7.
6. Gregory A. Bigley & Karlene H. Roberts, The Incident Command System: HighReliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1281,
1282 (2001).
7. Id.
8. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5-Management of Domestic Incidents,
I PUB. PAPERS 229 (Feb. 28, 2003).
9. William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 WIDENER L. REV.
491, 495 (2006) (citing Press Release, White House, Homeland Security Directive/HSPD 5, 16
(Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases.2003/02/2003022
89.html).
10. Id. at 511.
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complexity of the emergency incident.11 NIMS’s basic components include
preparedness, communications and information management, resource
In support of these
management, and command and management.12
components, ICS serves as the backbone for NIMS, and provides emergency
responders an organizational structure free from cumbersome jurisdictional
impediments.13 Since its inception, ICS has evolved into an “all-risk” system
capable of responding to any emergency, irrespective of type or scope.14 Also,
ICS has begun to have a presence in federal and state statutory law.15
ICS represents a comprehensive on-site incident management approach
that provides a flexible organizational framework to respond to small and
large-scale emergency situations. The organizational structure implemented
through ICS seeks to efficiently and effectively coordinate the efforts of public
safety personnel and first-responders to rapidly and effectively take action in
The command system seeks to prevent the
emergency situations.16
dissemination of unreliable information, inadequate communications and poor
coordination among relevant emergency responders, and reduce jurisdictional
conflicts among government officials.17 In addition, a salient objective of ICS
is to advance the capabilities of decision makers to grasp an awareness of
dynamic, and often rapidly changing, crisis situations and the public safety
implications.18

11. Aileen M. Marty, Hurricane Katrina: A Deadly Warning Mandating Improvement to the
National Response to Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 423, 433 (2007).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 426.
14. See Bigley & Roberts, supra note 6, at 1282.
15. Federal and state agencies that have adopted ICS management concepts include the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which requires the use of an incident command
system for emergency response to hazardous materials incidents. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120
(2002) (this same section in Appendix C, subsection (6), contains an extensive discussion of the
Incident Command System). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q) (applying the federal
government’s emergency response to hazardous substance releases); 6 U.S.C. § 317 (2006)
(regarding the operation of regional offices within the Department of Homeland Security). State
statutes that have mandated the use of an incident command system, include: ALASKA STAT. §§
26.23.075(c), 26.23.077(b), (c) (2002); IND. CODE § 10-14-3-10.6(d) (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
48-928(o) (2004); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/20 (West 2006).
16. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q)(3)(ii) (2002).
17. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin, What Is an Incident
Command Center, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/what_is_ics.html (last visited January 6,
2010) (“ICS is a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to
allow respondents to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and
demands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional
boundaries.”).
18. See, e.g., id. (“An ICS enables integrated communication and planning by establishing a
manageable span of control.”).
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As a functioning management system, ICS includes units that focus on
command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration.19 These
units work in concert to enhance control and remove chaos from the
emergency response effort.20 Understanding that any emergency response
situation, regardless of scope, will likely occur with no warning, ICS seeks to
eliminate common problems that emergency responders may face.21 Problems
such as the flow of reliable incident information, defining jurisdictional lines
of authority, and development of coordinated incident objectives may severely
hamper emergency response efforts.22
For college and university administrators, the challenge of responding to
an on-campus emergency may be even more daunting given the diversified and
decentralized structure of the campus environment. Therefore, the higher
education community should give careful consideration to the methods and
management approaches, such as ICS, that attempt to improve coordination
and effectiveness.
III. A VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING CAMPUS SAFETY CASE
LAW
Common law decisions addressing disputes regarding safety and security
concerns at colleges and universities can be traced to the early twentieth
century. In the 1913 Gott v. Berea College23 case, the court found that the
doctrine of in loco parentis granted institutional administrators the power to
unilaterally bar certain activities by students in the interest of protecting the
college and student community.24 The case involved the enforcement of the
college’s rule which barred students from “forbidden places”—specifically, a
local eating place.25 Students who refused to abide by the college’s rule were
subject to expulsion.26 The plaintiff, an owner of a local restaurant, sought an
injunction to prevent enforcement of the college’s rule because it would injure
his business.27 Finding that the college had the authority to adopt rules to
protect the students, the court stated:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral
welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that
end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

MOLINO, supra note 3, at 7; see also Parker, supra note 4, at 26.
Parker, supra note 4, at 28.
Id.
Id.
161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913).
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether
the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to
the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the case may be, and, in the
exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the
rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy.28

Thus, by acknowledging that the relationship between the college and the
student was characterized by the in loco parentis doctrine, colleges and
universities were granted authority to impose reasonable restrictions for the
best interest of the students.29
As student activism during the 1960s and 1970s unfolded at college
campuses across the United States, courts abandoned the in loco parentis
doctrine, and the link between colleges and students came to be viewed as a
contractual relationship.30 The consequential questions became whether
colleges and universities have a duty to provide campus safety and security,
and to what extent an institution may be legally liable when a breach of
security occurs.31
In Mullins v. Pine Manor College,32 a student was abducted from her
dormitory room and raped.33 The plaintiff sued the college for negligence, and
the state court held that the college had a duty to exercise reasonable care in
providing campus security.34 Although recognizing the decline of the in loco
parentis doctrine, the court reasoned that the college maintained a duty to
protect the well-being of its resident students.35 The court found that the
college could not abandon any effort to protect students, and parents and
students had a reasonable expectation that the college would provide adequate
security.36 In ruling that the college was negligent, the court pointed to
evidence indicating that the college had a deficient security system, improperly
supervised security guards, faulty locks, and other findings that demonstrated
the college’s failures were the substantial cause of the harm.37 For these

28. Gott, 161 S.W. at 206.
29. Id. at 207.
30. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding
that a tax-supported college was required to grant students due process before expulsion from the
institution for misconduct). See also Kristen Peters, Protecting the Millennial College Student,
16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST., 431, 437 (2007).
31. Oren R. Griffin, Confronting the Evolving Safety and Security Challenge at Colleges and
Universities, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 413, 418 (2007).
32. 449 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Mass. 1983).
33. Id. at 334.
34. Id. at 340.
35. Id. at 335–36.
36. Id. at 336.
37. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 338.
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reasons, the court found that the college’s failures proximately caused the
student’s injuries.38
In Eiseman v. State,39 however, the State University College at Buffalo
avoided liability regarding the rape and murder of a student that occurred on its
campus.40 Larry Campbell, an ex-felon with a history of drug abuse, criminal
conduct, and diagnoses with several mental health disorders that included
schizophrenia, was conditionally released from prison in December 1975 after
pleading guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs and receiving a sixyear sentence.41 In the spring semester of 1976, Campbell began taking classes
at the college and lived on campus after being admitted to a state-wide
program designed to offer higher education opportunities to disadvantaged
high school graduates.42 Within a few months after living on campus,
Campbell murdered two students, one of whom was Rhomna Eiseman, and
inflicted serious injuries upon another nonstudent.43 Subsequently, Eiseman’s
representatives filed suit alleging that the college breached its duty to protect
students from the unreasonable risk and foreseeable danger posed by
Campbell.44
The court held that there was no justification for imposing such a duty, and
acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ claims centered on whether a college has a
legal duty to shield its students from harm when the college admits an ex-felon
as part of an approved special program.45 The court found that the college had
no heightened duty of inquiry relative to Campbell’s prior imprisonment, nor
did it have an obligation to restrict Campbell’s contact with other students.46
Absolving the college of any liability for acts or omission regarding Eiseman’s
death, the court stated, “while hindsight has a peculiar clarity and wisdom, the
fact remains that the contemporaneous, non-reviewable judgments by which
the college’s actions must be evaluated were that Campbell, upon his release,
needed no psychiatric care or other treatment, and further that he had a
potential for success in college.”47
In Peschke v. Carroll College,48 John Aills shot a food service employee
on May 18, 1990, at Carroll College in Helena, Montana.49 Shortly before the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 339.
511 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1131–32.
Id. at 1132.
Eiseman, 511 N.E.2d at 1136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
929 P.2d 874 (Mont. 1997).
Id. at 876.
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shooting, Aills and a companion entered the chapel located on the Carroll
College campus where Father Courtney was conducting mass.50 During mass,
the campus priest observed that Aills had a handgun in his possession.51 Aills
and his companion were also sources of disruption during mass, hollering and
banging on pews.52 Father Courtney confronted Aills about his behavior and
detected the smell of alcohol on Aills’ breath and subsequently escorted Aills
from the chapel.53 Aills left the chapel and entered the college cafeteria where
he shot the plaintiff, Emma Peschke, in the chest.54
The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the college alleging that
Father Courtney failed to provide a proper warning or notify the security
personnel prior to the shooting.55 According to the plaintiff, either Father
Courtney or the college had a duty to arrest, disarm, or remove Aills from the
campus prior to the shooting.56 The jury returned a verdict finding that the
college was not negligent, and the plaintiff sought a new trial—which the court
denied.57 The court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict that the college did not breach its duty.58 There was no history of
serious security problems at Carroll College or criminal activities with persons
visiting the campus.59 The plaintiff did call a security expert to testify, who
criticized the fact that the college failed to post the 911 emergency phone
number signs and that the campus lacked radio communications.60 On crossexamination, however, plaintiff’s expert witness admitted that he had not
reviewed crime statistics for the college or the surrounding city, nor had the
security expert ever been to the Carroll campus.61 In short, the court found that
there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict and insufficient
evidence that the trial court abused its discretionary power.62 Thus, the jury’s
verdict in favor of the college was affirmed.63

50. Id.
51. Id. at 878.
52. Id. at 876.
53. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 876.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 878.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 881. In Kane v. Board of Governors, an associate professor was
shot and killed on campus by a student who issued threats before the shooting. 356 N.E.2d 1340,
1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). The professor’s surviving wife brought a damages claim for wrongful
death and sought declaratory relief. Id. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court
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A wrongful death action in Gragg v. Wichita State University,64 was
brought against Wichita State University (WSU) by the heirs of Barbara Gragg
after she and a companion were shot and killed while leaving the Celebrate ‘93
fireworks display, an Independence Day event held on the WSU campus July
4, 1993.65 Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that WSU failed to provide
adequate security, install sufficient lighting, or issue warnings about potential
criminal activity near the campus.66
Since 1976, WSU had held a Fourth of July event every year at WSU’s
Cessna Stadium.67 A coordinating committee met several times prior to the
event and included members from the university administration, such as the
WSU Director of Community Relations and Special Events.68 The WSU
police department was directly involved in preparing the security plan before
the event and had been for ten years prior to the 1993 Celebrate event.69
Moreover, WSU’s President granted authority for the use of Cessna Stadium
for the fireworks portion of the event, which was open to the public.70
Although the university was significantly involved in the event, a cooperative
effort between the Wichita Police Department and the WSU police department
provided security.71
Anthony Scott, a member of a street gang known as the “Insane Crips,”
shot Gragg.72 Scott had been involved in previous gang-related shootings and
attended the Celebrate ‘93 event looking for members of a rival gang known as
the “Junior Boys.”73 After the fireworks display, Gragg and her companion
left the WSU stadium by taking a short walk across a grassy field on the WSU
south campus when Scott shot and killed them.74 Following the shooting,
police in the area responded and quickly apprehended Scott.75 He was
subsequently charged with murder and later convicted.76
In the civil action brought by Gragg’s surviving family members, the court
found that WSU owed no duty to protect Gragg from the criminal acts of an

decision dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint and finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s sole
remedy was provided by the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. Id. at 1345.
64. 934 P.2d 121 (Kan. 1997).
65. Id. at 125.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 126.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id.
74. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 126.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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unknown third party.77 The plaintiff relied on § 318 of the Restatement of
Torts, which refers to the duty a possessor of land has to control the conduct of
third parties.78 The court, however, noted that this provision did not apply
because WSU lacked sufficient knowledge to control Scott’s actions.79
Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended that liability should also be extended
to the Celebrate ‘93 corporate sponsors, which included several radio stations
and corporations.80 The plaintiffs argued that these sponsors were possessors
of the WSU campus, were engaged in a joint venture with WSU, and exercised
the requisite control of Celebrate ‘93 through a coordinating committee.81
Relying on the Restatement of Torts § 328E, a possessor of land requires
occupation of the land with the intent to control it.82 In order to determine
liability, the court recognized the critical factors on causation of the harm
included either occupation with the intent to control the conditions or proof
that the alleged wrongdoer had the right to control the conditions.83 The court
concluded that assessing liability against the sponsors as possessors of land
would be consistent with finding that the sponsors had a duty to provide
reasonably safe conditions on the premises.84 The Restatement definition of
duty, however, confirms that no duty exists if the actor has no right of control
over the conditions causing the harm.85 Relying on a Kansas appellate
decision, the court noted the following:
In a premises liability case, in order to be liable, the party charged must have
had control over the premises in question. It is obvious that, without control,
the responsibility for the dangerous or hazardous condition cannot exist. To put
it another way, a party may not be held responsible for a condition which he or
86
she did not cause and which he or she has no ability to remedy.

The sponsors involved in Celebrate ‘93 at the WSU campus had a limited
role, and did not have the authority to manage the WSU campus facilities or
security measures implemented for the event.87 The court recognized that
WSU had direct control for security, and sponsorship did not establish a right

77. Id. at 135.
78. Id. at 128.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 344 (1965). These sections deal with
the duty to protect that may be owed by a possessor of land, and as the Kansas Supreme Court
held, neither was applicable in the instant case. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 129.
80. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 127.
81. Id. at 130.
82. Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 131.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. a (1965).
86. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 130–131 (quoting Rogers v. Omega Concrete Sys. Inc., 883 P.2d
1204, 1207 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)).
87. Id. at 131.
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of control.88 Moreover, the court made a distinction between sponsoring an
event and being responsible for the actions that take place at an event, and held
that the sponsors lacked the control to establish that they were possessors of
the WSU premises or owed some duty to Gragg that was violated.89
As for whether a sufficient special relationship existed that created a duty
which WSU owed to Gragg, the court indicated that WSU had control and
possession of the premises for the Celebrate ‘93 event.90 WSU’s ownership
and control of the property, however, did not automatically establish that WSU
had a duty to Gragg to prevent the shooting.91 The court acknowledged the
Supreme Court of Kansas’ well-recognized decision in Nero v. Kansas State
University,92 which involved a sexual assault in a co-ed housing unit.93 The
university in Nero knew the attacker’s history of sexual assault, but proceeded
to place him in a dormitory with the victim without warning the occupants.94
Denying the university’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held that “a
state university owes student tenants the same duty to exercise due care for
their protection as a private landowner owes to its tenants.”95 The facts in
Nero, however, differ significantly from the facts raised against WSU. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, the attack that led to Graggs’ death was
unanticipated and unexpected.96 Put another way, the court dismissed the
action against WSU because the shooting on the WSU campus following the
Celebrate ‘93 event was unforeseeable to the reasonably prudent person.97
The case of McEnaney v. State98 involved a December 1994 incident
where a student entered a lecture hall at the State University of New York at
Albany (“SUNYA”) and proceeded to hold a professor and several students at
gunpoint, including Jason McEnaney.99 The student gunman, Ralph Tortorici,
allowed the professor to call certain public officials.100 While police were
called to the scene, Tortorici threatened the students who remained hostages.101

88. Id.
89. Id. at 132.
90. Id. at 132–33
91. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 133.
92. 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993).
93. Id. at 772.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 780 (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 135 (citing Cupples v. State, 861 P.2d 1360 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)
(defining foreseeability as “a common-sense perception of the risks involved in certain situations
and includes whatever is likely enough to happen that a reasonably prudent person would take it
into account”)).
98. 700 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
99. Id. at 259.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Recognizing that the gunman was distracted, McEnanery took action to disarm
Tortorici and was shot in the struggle.102 Tortorici was taken into custody and
subsequently charged and convicted of first-degree assault, kidnapping, and
other crimes.103
The plaintiff subsequently filed a suit against the State of New York and
SUNYA alleging that the university was negligent in providing proper security
for its students, which proximately caused McEnaney’s injuries.104 McEnaney
further claimed that SUNYA breached the duty of care that it owed to students
in its capacity as a landowner.105 The Court of Claims granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, affirmed the complaint’s dismissal.106 The court’s finding rested
upon a close review of the plaintiff’s allegation, challenging the adequacy of
SUNYA’s overall security system and its particular security provisions and
practices.107 These activities, providing police protection through campus
security, involved the state university’s fulfillment of its governmental
function, not its propriety capacity as a landowner.108 The court found this
inquiry determinative based on well-settled law that a state university is
immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their
governmental function unless the injured party can establish a special
SUNYA’s failure to adopt certain security measures,
relationship.109
implement an overall security plan, or warn of potential criminal activity were
governmental functions because they grew directly out of the failure to allocate
police resources.110 Hence, the specific acts and omissions alleged in the
plaintiff’s lawsuit flowed from the performance of governmental functions, not
propriety functions.111 Nor did the plaintiff allege that a special relationship
existed between himself and the state university, or that the university assumed
a legal duty, via promise, action, or otherwise, to protect him from criminal

102. Id. at 260; see also Man Sentenced in Albany Hostage Drama N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1996, at A29.
103. McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
104. Id. at 259–60.
105. Id. at 260.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 261.
108. McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
109. Id. The Court recognized that the special duty rule is a limited exception to the general
rule: “The general rule reflects the judicial recognition that a governmental entity’s allocation of
limited public resources to provide security to the public remains a matter of legislative and
executive decision making, as it requires the exercise of discretion in making the necessary policy
tradeoffs between various security measures.” Id.
110. Id. at 262.
111. Id.
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acts of third parties.112 Given this reality, the court found the state university
immune from liability.113
At issue in Letsinger v. Drury College114 was whether a student occupant
who shot at a fraternity house on the Drury College campus in Springfield,
Missouri could sustain a negligence claim against the college and fraternity.115
In May 1997, the plaintiff, John Letsinger, was shot at a house occupied by the
Beta Iota chapter of Kappa Alpha fraternity on the Drury College campus.116
Before the shooting, a hostile telephone exchange took place between
Letsinger and an unidentified caller, where Letsinger eventually told the caller
to shut up or come over and fight.117 Joe Lee Daniel soon arrived at the
fraternity house, pulled out a gun, and shot Letsinger.118 Letsinger alleged that
the college was negligent in that it failed to provide basic security, and that this
breach proximately caused his injuries.119
The Supreme Court of Missouri acknowledged that, as a general rule, the
college had no duty to protect a person from deliberate criminal attacks by a
third person.120 The court, however, noted that an exception to this rule exists
when: (1) a landlord-tenant relationship exists between two parties, and (2)
other “special circumstances” exist, warranting a shift of responsibility for the
tenant’s security from the tenant to the landlord.121 Although the lower court
granted the college’s motion for summary judgment, the record in the case
indicated that there was no express contract or agreement defining the
existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the
college, or the plaintiff and Kappa Alpha fraternity.122 The court found that the
record included conflicting and contradictory evidence regarding the existence
of a landlord-tenant relationship.123 While the circuit court granted the college
and fraternity summary judgment, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the decision because material issues of fact existed about whether a
landlord-tenant relationship existed and the character of plaintiff’s occupancy
as a tenant or licensee.124

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
68 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Letsinger, 68 S.W.3d at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 411.
Letsinger, 68 S.W.3d at 412.
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RLI Insurance Co. v. Simon’s Rock Early College125 centered on a dispute
between a college’s primary insurance carrier and its excess liability insurer
regarding whether actions by the college and its employees that arguably led to
a on-campus shooting spree constituted a single occurrence under the college’s
primary insurance policy.126 The court found that all claims resulting from the
eighteen-minute shooting spree on December 14, 1992 at Bard College at
Simon’s Rock in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, constituted a single
occurrence that would obligate the primary insurer to its one million dollar per
occurrence limit, and obligate the excess liability insurer to begin payment
upon exhaustion of the primary insurance policy limit.127
The facts set forth in this case, however, illustrate more than whether
multiple events involved in an active shooting incident on a college campus
can constitute a single occurrence for insurance purposes. The pertinent facts
identified by the Massachusetts appellate court pointed out the opportunity
college officials had, but apparently missed, that could have averted the
shooting.128 For instance, the college knew that a package was sent to the
student shooter, Wayne Lo, with a suspicious return address containing the
notation “Classic Arms.”129 While the package raised concerns among
residence hall directors and a college dean, the school eventually delivered the
package to Lo.130 After receiving the package, the student refused to permit
college officials to view its contents, but did explain that he had some
weapons-related items as a gift for his father.131 More importantly, the facts
presented in the case indicate that later that same day, college officials received
information that Lo did indeed have a gun and that he intended to kill.132
Shortly thereafter, those on campus heard gunfire, signaling the start of Lo’s
shooting spree.133 The facts arguably suggest that college officials might have
missed an opportunity to avert this tragic shooting, which resulted in death.
But what may be more striking from the facts of this case is the absence of a
coherent, systematic response to a safety threat.

125. 765 N.E.2d 247 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
126. Id.; see also Anthony DePalma, Questions Outweigh Answers In Shooting Spree at
College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A1.
127. Simon’s Rock Early Coll., 765 N.E.2d at 254.
128. Id. at 251.
129. Id. at 249.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 249–50. Upon entering Lo’s room, the residence hall director observed empty
black plastic magazines, a black plastic rifle stock, and an empty metallic army surplus cartridge
box. Id.
132. Simon’s Rock Early Coll., 765 N.E.2d at 250.
133. Id.
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In Rogers v. Delaware State University,134 the court reversed and
remanded, in part, a summary judgment decision granted for Delaware State
University (DSU) in a lawsuit brought by a student to recover damages for
injuries sustained as a result of a targeted attack.135 The situation began when
a female student, fleeing her ex-boyfriend, asked the plaintiff-student to drive
her to the police station.136 Later that same evening, the ex-boyfriend, who
suspected that the plaintiff-student and the female student had an intimate
relationship, shot the plaintiff in the face.137 All events relevant to the shooting
happened at a motel that the university used as a supplemental student housing
facility.138 The plaintiff applied for on-campus student housing, but due to
excessive demand, numerous students, including the plaintiff, were placed in
supplemental housing at an off-campus location.139 The court found that the
university maintained no obligation to provide reasonable safety measures at
the motel location, even though it housed students.140
A lower court granted DSU’s motion for summary judgment, finding the
attack was neither foreseeable nor preventable, and that deficient security
measures did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries.141 The Delaware Superior Court
specifically found that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an unforeseeable
targeted attack, and that the university owed the plaintiff no duty to protect
him.142 On appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court found material
issues of fact existed regarding whether the attack was foreseeable, and the
proximate cause of the student shooting.143 As to what obligation the
university had to protect the student from harm, the court stated, “Although
DSU has a duty to exercise reasonable care when it undertakes to provide
housing off campus for its students, this was not a contractual duty.”144
DeSanto v. Youngstown State University145 involved a student shooting
that occurred off-campus, but that was triggered by a verbal altercation
following a dance held at an on-campus pub.146 Jermaine Hopkins, a student
enrolled at Youngstown State University, attended a dance at the pub on

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

No. 542,2005, 2006 WL 2085460, at *1 (Del. July 25, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rogers, 2006 WL 2085460, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rogers, 2006 WL 2085460, at *2.
No. 99-08777, 2002 WL 31966960, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 31, 2002).
Id.
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January 27, 1996.147 Sometime after midnight, a fight ensued and campus
police officers arrived on the scene, ended the dance, and began to disperse the
crowd of over 150 people.148 As people were leaving the pub, in the presence
of campus police officers, a verbal altercation between Hopkins and Timothy
Slocum took place in the lobby during which Slocum threatened to kill
Hopkins.149 Although Hopkins had to be physically restrained by a campus
police officer, the dispute with Slocum did not escalate, and the campus police
officers ended the party.150 Later that same evening, Eric Moore, a nonstudent,
shot Hopkins in relation to the earlier altercation.151 After being transported to
the hospital, Hopkins died.152
Hopkins’ parents filed a lawsuit, alleging that the state university was
negligent because the campus police officers failed to arrest or detain Slocum
after he threatened to kill their son.153 The court, however, found that campus
police officers’ primary objective at the dance was to disperse the unruly
crowd and that the officers’ decision to arrest Slocum was discretionary.154
Also, expert testimony provided at trial indicated that an arrest during the
confrontation might have heightened tension and made the situation more
dangerous.155 Thus, the court found the decision not to arrest Slocum for
threatening to kill Hopkins reasonable.156
Furthermore, the university did not owe Hopkins a duty beyond that owed
to the general public.157 The plaintiffs could not demonstrate that Hopkins had
a special relationship with the university or that the university owed Hopkins a
special duty distinct and separate from the duty owed to the general public.158
The plaintiffs’ negligence claim also failed because they could not show
proximate cause.159 Eric Moore, a nonstudent, shot and killed Hopkins.160

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *2.
155. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. To establish a special relationship, the following elements must exist: “1) an
assumption by the governmental entity of a duty to act on behalf of the injured party either
through promises or actions; 2) knowledge on the part of the governmental agents that inaction
could lead to harm; 3) some form of direct contact between the governmental agents and the
injured party; and 4) the injured party’s justifiable reliance on the governmental entity’s
affirmative undertaking.” Id. (citing Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ohio 1998)).
159. Id. at *3.
160. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *3.
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Plaintiffs failed to show how arresting or detaining Slocum would have
prevented Moore from shooting Hopkins.161
Despite Youngstown State University’s successful defense of the
plaintiff’s negligence and wrongful death claims, the troubling legacy of this
case is that within a few hours after a student’s life was threatened on-campus,
the student was actually shot and killed. While the court’s reasoning found the
university not liable on the merits, the circumstances presented suggest that the
campus police officers may have missed an opportunity to do more—perhaps
even something that could have saved Hopkins’s life. Could the campus police
officers on the scene have spoken to Hopkins about the threat? Should local
police have been contacted? Should there have been an assessment of the
threat and its likely probability? On the other hand, would any of these actions
have been construed as an assumption of an affirmative duty by the state
university to act, thereby opening the door to the creation of a special
relationship and potentially exposing the university to tort liability? These
questions remain unanswered but may provide important insights into the
advancement of campus safety at American colleges and universities.
While judicial reasoning applied by courts to threats regarding campus
safety no longer embrace the tenets of the in loco parentis doctrine, as
demonstrated in the 1913 Gott decision, it is difficult to find complete
sanctuary in the campus safety and security approaches that may escape
scrutiny because an institution’s actions are protected by the sovereign
immunity or particularized tort law arguments absolving a college or university
of a legal duty to act. The tragic circumstances examined in cases like Gragg,
McEnaney, and DeSanto are likely to be repeated in similar fashion at other
campuses across the nation, and university counsel and administrations are
likely to use similar arguments to defend their institutions. The campus safety
and security dilemma that confronts higher education demands innovative legal
and statutory efforts to protect and preserve the college and university
community.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTORY EFFORTS INTENDED TO ADVANCE
CAMPUS SAFETY INITIATIVES AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

The concern of lawmakers and governmental officials to violence and
security problems at colleges and universities has led to legislative action. As
will be discussed in this section, many states have considered and passed laws
requiring disclosure of crime statistics and data relevant to security threats.
Some statutes have even mandated enhanced coordination among firstresponders and emergency personnel, including implementation of ICS
concepts. Such enactments represent an important component in the campus
safety effort that demands careful consideration.

161. Id.
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The New Jersey Campus Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act162 was
signed into law in December 1994 to provide certain rights for victims of
campus-related sexual assaults.163 The statute accords a series of rights to
“victims of sexual assaults that occur on the campus of any public or
independent institution of higher education in the State . . . .”164 Among the
rights provided by the statute are the right to have allegations of sexual assault
treated seriously, the right to be treated with dignity, and the right to be free
from pressure from campus personnel to report or refrain from reporting
crimes.165 While these rights as set out by the statute may demonstrate the
intent to be sensitive to the concerns of sexual assault victims, they may raise
expectations that are difficult to satisfy. For example, while it is admirable to
avoid placing pressure on an assault victim, law enforcement officials may
need detailed reports and information of the crime to pursue and arrest the
perpetrator.
Furthermore, section 2 of the statute indicates that victims have the right
“to be free from any suggestion that victims should refrain from reporting
crimes in order to avoid unwanted personal publicity.”166 While this provision
may accommodate a victim’s interest in avoiding public attention, it may
interfere with an institution’s campus safety objectives.167 Colleges and
universities, acting in conjunction with law enforcement, may need wide
discretion when responding to threats to the campus community. Victims or
persons with knowledge regarding crimes or offenses may be the only source
of information about criminal incidents. Thus, college and university
administrators should be given some reasonable level of discretion to
investigate and pursue perpetrators of crimes committed against students and
others on campus.168 While the language cited in the New Jersey Campus
Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights may be seen as burdensome to campus
administrators, it triggers an important discussion regarding the importance of
remaining sensitive to the privacy of crime victims on college and university
campuses.

162. The New Jersey Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
18A:61E-1–6 (West 1999).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 18A:61E-2.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 18A:61E-2(d).
167. The New Jersey Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:61E-5. Section 5 of the statute states that nothing in the statute should be construed to
preclude the reporting of crimes or offenses to law enforcement officers. The language used to
articulate victim rights in section 2, however, appears to contradict section 5.
168. See id. § 18A:61E-6 (insulating colleges and universities from liability unless there is
evidence of reckless, willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct).
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The Kristin Smart Campus Security Act169 requires California postsecondary institutions receiving public funding to enter into written agreements
with local law enforcement agencies regarding coordination and responsibility
for investigating criminal activity on or near campuses.170 The California
statute was passed, at least in part, to clarify the operational responsibilities for
investigations of crimes that occur on college and university campuses among
campus law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies.171 The
statute was passed after the California Senate held hearings regarding the May
1996 disappearance of Kristin Smart, a student at California Polytechnic State
University at San Luis Obispo.172 Following reports of her disappearance,
multiple law enforcement agencies were involved in the investigation.173 The
statute is intended to improve coordination among agencies participating in
criminal investigations at higher education institutions.174 Section 67381
provides that the written agreement entered into by colleges, universities, and
law enforcement agencies shall delineate geographical boundaries for each
agency’s operational responsibility.175 This approach is similar to the ICSNIMS rationale, and suggests that California lawmakers recognize the
importance of highly coordinated campus security efforts.176
The Oklahoma Campus Safety Act177 addresses concerns relative to the
establishment and jurisdictional authority of campus police departments.178
The Act extends to public and private institutions of higher education, as well
as public school districts within Oklahoma and grants the these institutions’
governing boards the power to commission campus police officers and revoke
such commission for any reason.179 Furthermore, the Act provides that
municipalities and county sheriffs’ departments may enter into agreements
with campus police departments to recognize and clarify jurisdictional
boundaries.180 While coordination is encouraged in the form of “mutual

169. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67381 (West 2003).
170. Id.
171. See S.B. 1729, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
172. Id.; see also Decade Passes; Pain Lingers, RECORDNET, May 25, 2006,
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060525/NEWS01/605250335/1001.
173. Id.
174. Cal. S.B. 1729.
175. Id. It is important to point out that staff comments regarding the state senate bill that
eventually passed as the Kristin Smart Campus Safety Act of 1998 indicated that it was unclear
what problem the bill was trying to correct and whether the bill would have the intended effect.
Id. The staff comments also stated that some campuses shared boundaries with more than one
local law enforcement agency and might have to establish several written agreements. Id.
176. See supra Part II.
177. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 360.15 (West 2003).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 360.18(A)–(B).
180. Id. § 360.20.
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assistance agreements,” the Act does not seek to create an agent-principal
relationship between the campus police officer and any municipality or
county.181 Thus, while the Act’s provisions may be viewed as narrow or
limited in scope, overall, the Act acknowledges the need for coordinated law
enforcement efforts to effectively respond to campus security threats.
Although originally passed into law in 1994, the State of Illinois Campus
Security Act182 has undergone important modifications resulting in new
requirements for state colleges and universities.183 While section 10 of the Act
provides for the establishment of a community task force to coordinate crime
prevention activities with community leaders and service providers, the
provision does not address concerns that might be raised among colleges and
universities with particularity.184 In 2008, the legislature amended the Campus
Security Act and effectively re-named it the Campus Security Enhancement
Act of 2008, adding section 20 to the Act.185 Section 20, subtitled “campus
security enhancement,” directly responds to concerns regarding higher
education institutions.186 Accordingly, section 20 requires each institution of
higher education in the state to develop a NIMS, “a multi-jurisdictional
campus violence prevention plan.”187 Implementation of the plan will include
training and exercises, the formation of a campus violence prevention
committee, and a campus threat assessment team.188 In addition, county and
regional officials with the appropriate emergency management agencies will
also be required to provide assistance throughout the planning and training
process.189 Thus, section 20 of the Illinois Campus Security Act, which
181. Id.
182. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/1 (West 2006).
183. Id.
184. Id. 12/10.
185. Id. 12/20.
186. Id. 12/20.
187. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/20 (West 2006).
188. Id.
189. Id. Specifically, county and regional officials, along with the appropriate emergency
management agencies, shall assist in the planning and training involved with developing:
A National Incident Management System-compliant, all-hazards, emergency response
plan in partnership with the institution’s county or major municipal emergency
management official, report the plan to this official, and have training and exercises for
the plan annually at a minimum; and (2) develop an inter-disciplinary and multijurisdictional campus violence prevention plan, including coordination of and
communication between all available campus and local mental health and first response
resources, in partnership with the institution’s county or major municipal emergency
management official, report the plan to this official, and have training and exercises for
the plan annually at a minimum. The campus violence prevention plan shall include the
development and implementation of a campus violence prevention committee and campus
threat assistance team.
Id.
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became effective January 1, 2009, seeks to develop a fully integrated campus
security approach.190
Passage of the Act came in the aftermath of the tragic shooting that
occurred in February 2008 at the Northern Illinois University campus.191
Following passage of the Campus Security Enhancement Act, the University’s
President John Peters said:
[W]e learned all too well on February 14th, it is necessary for our colleges and
universities to have emergency operations plans in place . . . . I commend the
Illinois General Assembly and the Governor for recognizing, through the
passage of this Act, the importance of adequate campus security procedures
192
and responses to protect our students, faculty and staff.

The Illinois law represents a step forward for campus safety at colleges and
universities, but will require continual political and community support to
ensure effective implementation of the law’s ambitious provisions.
In Kentucky, colleges and universities must adhere to the Campus Safety
and Security Act,193 also known as the Michael Minger Act, after Michael
Minger, a student killed in a residence hall fire on the Murray State University
campus.194 The governor signed the Act into law in March 2000.195 It grants
the fire marshal substantial jurisdictional authority over property at public and
private institutions of higher education for the administration and enforcement
of laws designed to protect the public from fire loss.196 The Minger Act
incorporates concepts consistent with the Incident Command System by
consolidating decision-making authority with the fire marshal regarding threats
of fire or arson that may occur on college and university campuses.197 It is
important to note that the Kentucky statute applies to the entire campus,
including residential facilities operated by any recognized student
This would include facilities operated by student
organization.198

190. Id. 12/99.
191. Press Release, Office of Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor Blagojevich Signs Campus
Security Enhancement Act (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ibhe.org/FridayMemo/misc/
080822_SB2691.pdf.
192. Id. (quoting Northern Illinois University President John Peters).
193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948 (LexisNexis 2006).
194. Disclosure Law Working, UK Official Says, THE CINCINNATI-KENTUCKY POST, Sept.
10, 2002, at 3K.
195. Id.
196. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948.
197. See Disclosure Law Working, supra note 194 (noting that the goal of the Minger Act
requires decision-making to occur with the fire marshal, which is consistent with ICS goals of
coordination between strategic and tactical operations).
198. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948.
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organizations such as fraternities and sororities that have occasionally been
involved with disruptive campus activity.199
In addition, the Act established a crime reporting standard that requires
Kentucky colleges and universities to maintain a crime log, and report crimes
and security threats to the campus community.200 The statute also requires
prompt reporting of criminal incidents, such that disclosure to the public would
be available within twenty-four hours of the first report.201 The release of
information, however, may be withheld where there is clear and convincing
evidence that releasing it may cause a suspect to flee or evade detection, or
result in the destruction of evidence.202 Thus, the crime reporting provisions of
the statute are designed to avoid interference with the pursuit and capture of
criminal suspects, while urging college and university administrators to
disseminate information about criminal activity as soon as practicable.203
The statute’s proactive emphasis is further embraced by the requirement
that postsecondary education institutions design programs to inform students
and employees about campus safety and security procedures.204 Beyond the
Act’s crime report provisions, it also directs colleges and universities to
prepare and equip their students and employees on how to prevent campus
security breaches.205 The statute demands that administrators at postsecondary
education institutions develop an informed and knowledgeable campus
community. Through information sharing and training, perhaps fewer persons
will be subject to harm or criminal wrongdoing.
In 1999, New York Governor George E. Pataki signed into law the state’s
Campus Safety Act,206 which was dedicated to the memory of Suzanne Lyall, a
student at State University at New York–Albany, who mysteriously
disappeared from campus and was never seen again.207 The Act requires
colleges and universities to promptly investigate violent felonies on college
campuses and file reports of missing students.208 An additional provision
requires colleges and universities to disclose crime statistics in campus
199. See generally Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities:
Re-evaluating Vicarious Liability and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 REV. LITIG.
191, 192 (1988) (discussing examples of campus interaction with incidents involving fraternities
and sororities).
200. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.9481(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
201. Id. § 164.9481(1)(b).
202. Id. § 164.9481(1)(b)(1).
203. Id. § 164.9481(2)(c) (providing that institutions should use computer networks and post
crime reports in residential facilities and use other campus publications and media outlets to share
information regarding threats to campus safety).
204. Id. § 164.9485(2).
205. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.9485(2).
206. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6430–6435 (McKinney 2009).
207. Elsa Brenner, Campus Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, at WE5.
208. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6434.
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catalogs and make clear the scope of authority extended to private college
security officers appointed to prevent criminal activity on campus.209 More
importantly, § 6434 requires colleges and universities to “adopt and
implement” plans for the investigation of violent felony offenses on college
campuses.210 While the Act does not specify what is required for each
institution’s plan, it does state that the plan should coordinate investigation and
reporting efforts among law enforcement agencies.211 The Act’s emphasis on
coordination is essential to maintaining campus safety and security and, like
the other statutes, consistent with ICS concepts.
Finally, it is important to note that Congress recently enacted new
regulatory changes to federal law pursuant to the reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act of 1965.212 On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed the
Higher Education Opportunity Act (“HEOA” or the “Act”) into law, imposing
new reporting and disclosure obligations on institutions that participate in Title
IV federal student financial aid programs.213 More specifically, the Act places
new requirements on colleges and universities, many in response to tragic
campus shooting incidents that have resulted in the deaths of students, faculty,
and staff.214 Among other provisions, the HEOA amends the Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act
(“Clery Act”)215 by requiring that an institution annually issue a statement of
current policies regarding immediate emergency response and evacuation
procedures.216 The policy statement must articulate procedures that will be
used to notify the campus community upon confirmation of a significant
emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health
or safety of students or staff occurring on the campus.217
The HEOA may prompt college and university administrators to review or
even reconsider whether campus emergency response efforts are sufficiently
coordinated for maximum effect. Where shortcomings are found, strategic
modifications consistent with ICS concepts should be considered for
implementation.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. § 6433.
Id. § 6434.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008).
Id. § 152.
Id. § 153(a)(2).
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006).
Pub. L. No. 110-135, § 488(e), 122 Stat. 3297.
Id.
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V. THE ROLE OF FACULTY AND OTHERS IN CAMPUS SAFETY
In 1966, the American Association of University Professors, the American
Council on Education (“ACE”), and the Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges jointly formulated and issued a “Statement on
Government of Colleges and Universities,” which stated, in part, the following:
The faculty has primary responsibility for such . . . subject matter and methods
of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which
relate to the educational process . . . . Budgets, personnel limitations, the time
element, and the policies of other groups, bodies, and agencies having
jurisdiction over the institution may set limits to realization of faculty
218
advice.

While this statement appears to set out the activities that are within the purview
of the faculty, it also indicates that faculty may have limited input regarding
certain institutional functions. The traditional roles for faculty at colleges and
universities have focused on teaching, research, and service.219 Although the
teaching and research components may be self-defining, the service function is
diverse and may include activities on-campus and beyond the university
community.220 Governance, or shared governance, is among the institutionalbased service activities in which both faculty and administrators participate.221
In addition to contributing to the institution’s governance, faculty can and
should contribute to the institution’s policy-making process because the faculty
play a central role at a college or university: “In a very real sense, the faculty is
the university—its most productive element, its source of distinction. And
faculty members are properly partners in the enterprise with areas reserved for
their exclusive control.”222 As stakeholders in the higher education enterprise,
the faculty has unique insight with regard to the student population and may
have the capacity to identify threats to campus safety and security. Colleges
and universities should prepare faculty, as well as students and staff, to aid the
campus safety effort. In the aftermath of the tragic Virginia Tech shooting,
law enforcement officials appear to agree that campus safety requires the
attention of the entire university community:
Faculty, staff, and students should be trained on how to respond to various
emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used. This training
should be delivered through a number of delivery options, such as in-person

218. AMERICAN ASS’N OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT OF
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 135 (10th ed. 2006).
219. Adrianna Kezar et al., Challenging Stereotypes that Interfere with Effective Governance,
THOUGHT & ACTION: NEA HIGHER EDUC. J., at 121, 121 (2006).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 75 (5th ed. 2001).
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presentations (i.e., residential life programming; orientation sessions for
223
students and employees); Internet-based delivery; and documents.

The challenge for legislators, legal counsel, and higher education
administrators lies not only with campus safety concerns related to law and
policy, but also implementation of a campus safety and security paradigm
among the diverse members of the higher education community.
VI. RISK MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The importance of risk management should not be ignored or
underestimated as colleges and universities work to maintain a safe and secure
campus environment with the capability to effectively respond to emergency
situations. A basic responsibility for any public or private sector entity
involves assessing the nature and types of risks that confront an organization
and threaten to interfere with an organization’s mission and objectives.224 The
assessment of probable risk and corresponding exposure to catastrophic loss
requires that prudent decision-makers consider action to shift risk, spread risk,
or reduce risk.225 While these risk management methods can result in certain
efficiencies, higher education institutions often cannot avoid certain risks via a
negotiated agreement or by purchasing insurance.226 The wide array of
activities and programs that are commonplace at most postsecondary
educational institutions are vast and diverse.227 Higher education institutions
manage instructional facilities, laboratories, student residential housing,
apartment complexes, and recreational facilities, provide food services, and a
host of other operations.228 Students, faculty, and support personnel rely on the
stability and safety of the higher education environment to pursue their
academic endeavors and extra-curricular activities.229 Consequently, higher
education administrators are compelled to utilize various management
strategies, such as risk management, to mitigate sources of risk exposure.230

223. RAYMOND H. THROWER ET AL., INT’L ASS’N OF CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT
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MGMT. 36, 36 (1983).
225. See David A. Moss, Risk, Responsibility, and the Role of Government, 56 DRAKE L.
REV. 541, 542 (2008).
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Conceptually, risk management does not disdain error, loss, or the
potential for catastrophic events, but rather seeks to understand the probability
of error, loss, or unintended consequences and transform and minimize the
likelihood of such events.231 Risk encompasses the concepts of uncertainty,
probability, and consequences or potential impact.232 The risk management
process is dedicated to a prospective effort intended to minimize or prevent
future events that may lead to harmful occurrences.233 Further, risk
management is an ongoing practice integrated into the structure of an
organization for the purpose of anticipating preventable adverse events. More
importantly, risk management elements complement many facets found in the
Incident Command System.234
With respect to campus safety and security, risk management provides
higher education administrators with a viable construct to evaluate, coordinate,
and assess the various efforts that are advanced to reduce the consequences of
poor decision-making and manage risk within a zone of tolerance.235 The
analysis by higher education administrators, therefore, must consider the
probability of undesirable events occurring among students and faculty, and
the severity of such events.
The initial risk management phase focuses on development of anticipatory
mechanisms that will allow organizational resources to be used to minimize or
confine undesirable occurrences. This phase should result in the production of
plans that outline procedures to assure the continuous implementation of risk
management initiatives. The plans also describe goals, operational and
technical statements, and organizational structure that would assume
responsibility for operational integration of risk management concepts. For
higher education institutions, integrating risk management concepts into an
institution’s management processes remains critical because, like ICS
principles, it provides a viable avenue for colleges and universities to assess
and review potential threats and develop responses that improve campus safety
and emergency preparedness.

231. Oren R. Griffin et al., Systematizing Information for Public Sector Risk Management: A
Perspective from Higher Education, EDUC. RES. Q., Dec. 2000, at 21, 22.
232. Id. at 24.
233. Id. at 22.
234. See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, NIMS BASIC: THE INCIDENT
COMMAND SYSTEM. No. 501-8 (2006) (discussing the Incident Command System’s focus on
coordination of strategic and tactical operations, planning, logistics and human resources, and
how these objectives are consistent with the aims of risk management); see also Moss, supra note
225, at 555–57.
235. See E. FRANK HARRISON, THE MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 199 (1981);
see also W.H. Snider, Risk Management: A Retrospective View, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1991, at 47,
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Next, the risk management process should focus on risk assessment and
identification. This may include the creation of a risk assessment team
comprised of personnel with the necessary expertise to discover, analyze, and
communicate threats to organizational stability.236 Risk identification depends
on the systematic collection of salient information.237 For higher education,
emphasis should be placed on the discovery of information regarding risks
associated with particular academic programs, administrative initiatives, and
relevant off-campus enterprises. Once risks are identified through the
assessment phase, strategies and methods should be selected to achieve the
goals of risk reduction and increased stability.
Risk assessment as a risk management tool seeks to critically examine
programmatic and organizational threats. Two methods may be applied to
determine the nature and extent of risk exposure and threats.238 First, remedial
investigations can be used to collect information about risk exposure, such as
its origin, configuration, and likely severity.239 A second method used to
assess risk exposure is prospective: feasibility studies that evaluate possible
sources of risk and cost-effective ways to minimize risk exposure.240 The
importance of understanding the nature and extent of a particular exposure and
developing cost-effective solutions should be a concern for those aspiring to
manage risk effectively and efficiently.241 Furthermore, risk assessment should
not be viewed as a static exercise, but rather an on-going process done on a
regular basis, involving the accumulation of information critically related to
many organizational activities.242
While the risk analysis phase may not be wholly independent from the risk
assessment phase, risk analysis focuses on two tasks.243 First, like risk
assessment, risk analysis should include a probative review of those variables
that may expose the organization to liability or harm.244 Next, the analysis
phase of risk management evaluates and determines the feasibility of proposed
236. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Profiling an Effective Political Risk Assessment Team, RISK
MGMT., Feb. 1983, at 34, 37 (describing the importance of an experienced, expert risk
management team in the managing political risk).
237. Id.
238. Nanetta Bendyna, Minimizing Loss Through Risk Assessment, INFOSYSTEMS, Dec. 1984,
at 66, 66–67.
239. Id.
240. See Susan L. Santos, Risk Assessment: A Tool for Risk Management, ENVTL. SCI. TECH.,
Mar. 1987, at 239, 240 (discussing the importance of discovering the source and extent of
environmental hazards in assessing environmental risks).
241. Id. While some risk assessment concepts originate from the scientific and industrial
technology industries, the logic and rationale considered are applicable in diverse settings. Id.
242. John F. Adams & John W. Hall, Legal Liabilities in Higher Education: Their Scope and
Management, 3 J.C. & U.L. 215, 217 (1976).
243. Bendya, supra note 238, at 66 (describing a two-step risk assessment process).
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remedies that may be utilized to reduce risk exposure.245 The purpose of this
analytical phase is to generate information on a range of contingencies
available to avoid or to mitigate those adverse consequences identified as
threats to the organization or institution.246 Risk analysis should yield risk
control strategies or risk treatment strategies that decision-makers may
implement to manage risk. These strategies may include passive avoidance: a
conscious decision not to engage in certain risky activities. Other risk
treatment strategies include the assumption of certain risks while increasing the
organization’s capacity to respond to negative outcomes, and transferring or
shifting risk to other entities through subcontracting efforts or insurance
acquisition from third parties. While strategies that may be used to deal with
risk are unlimited, any approach chosen represents an affirmative effort to
prevent liability and/or harm to the organization rather than allowing an
organization to drift haphazardly.
The stakes are high for college and university administrators as well as
state and federal lawmakers. In the aftermath of recent campus shootings, are
colleges and universities better prepared today to prevent the loss of life by a
lone gunman or active shooter? Have state and federal laws provided the
framework for effective campus safety? If not, are there synergies that lie in
incident command systems and risk management concepts that can be
combined to advance security efforts at educational institutions? Arguably,
yes. While the mission of colleges and universities remains teaching, research,
and public service, the reality is that campus safety and security must become
an integrated responsibility of the institution.
VII. CONCLUSION: MANAGING THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE GOING FORWARD
American colleges and universities represent a tremendous global resource.
These institutions seek to educate individuals, while advancing ingenuity and
intellectual achievement in numerous academic and professional fields. To
allow the important work of higher education to be distracted or compromised
by campus security threats is unacceptable. Thus, colleges and universities,
regardless of size, classification, or mission, should consider incorporation of
the following: (1) implementation of threat assessment mechanisms that draw
from existing risk management processes, if any, and conform to incident
command system concepts that allow for early detection and response to
emergency situations; (2) development of comprehensive recurring campus
outreach efforts that teach faculty, staff, and students about potential threats,
crime statistics, and emergency response protocol; and (3) passage of state and
federal legislation that clarifies jurisdictional authority and grants law
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enforcement personnel the discretionary power to act promptly in emergency
situations, but that also allows penalties and corrective action to be taken
where discretionary power is abused by law enforcement personnel. The
objective should be to develop a legal and managerial paradigm that permits
colleges and universities to protect its campuses against the modern threats
without sacrificing the character of these treasured institutions of higher
education.

